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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION*
DANIEL P. KING
The author is a Probation and Parole Officer for the Division of Corrections, State of Wisconsin.
He received the B.S. degree in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin, and did graduate
work in the same field at the University of Missouri and Marquette University. He has written ex-
tensively in the criminological, political and legal fields in American, British and Canadian Journals.
Incarcerated persons are subjected to various deprivations as a consequence of being imprisoned.
When a prisoner alleges that his freedom to practice his chosen religion is being limited or denied, to
what extent and under what circumstances will a court examine the allegations and grant relief? Con-
centrating on cases litigated by Black Muslims, the author describes situations in which courts have
been forced to decide whether a sought-after religious practice is compatible with or detrimental to
reasonable prison discipline. The author believes that the courts have drawn a legitimate distinction
between freedom of thought and freedom of action.
Traditionally a variety of rights and privileges
are lost upon conviction of a felony. A convicted
offender has no absolute right to do any of a multi-
tude of things that the rest of society takes for
granted. Wide discretion is allowed prison adminis-
trators to define the conditions of imprisonment.
"They determine the way in which the offender
will live for the term of imprisonment; how he
is fed and clothed; whether he sleeps in a cell
or a dormitory; whether he spends his days
locked up or in relative freedom; what oppor-
tunity he has for work, education, or recrea-
tion. They regulate his access to the outside
world by defining mailing and visiting privi-
leges. They define rules of conduct and the
penalties for such rules.'"
Courts have only recently begun to show some
concern for the imprisoned offender. Certain limita-
tions on a prisoner's behavior by correctional au-
thorities have been upheld by the courts; for ex-
ample, limitations on conjugal visits,2 carrying on
business affairs such as attempting to secure the
publication of books written during incarceration,3
securing education through correspondence
courses,4 purchasing of books,5 and sending and
* The views expressed herein are solely those of the
author. They do not necessarily reflect the views,
official opinion, or policy of the Wisconsin Department
of Health and Social Services.
1 PRESiDENT's ComassIoN ON LAW ENFORCEi ENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTicE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: COiaECTIONs 84 (1967).2 Payne v. District of Columbia, 253 F.2d 867 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
'Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d. 850 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
4 Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).5 Grove v. Smyth, 169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1948).
receiving of mail.6 In other areas the courts ex-
tended some of the rights of prisoners. It has been
held that prisoners cannot be disciplined for filing
suit against prison officials,7 or for making allegedly
false statements in petitions before the merits of
the petition have been decided by the courts.8
Courts have upheld the right of access to legal ad-
vice9 and materials.Y° And in United States v.
Munizn the Supreme Court held that federal
prisoners could sue under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for injuries caused by the negligence of prison
authorities.
APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AImENDLIENT IN PRISON
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... "
These openingwords of the First Amendment to
the Constitution have led to a long series of cases
involving restrictions on the religious practices of
prison inmates.
Practically all prisons have developed an exten-
sive religious program for inmates. Large prisons
have both a Catholic and Protestant chaplain. The
chaplains perform a wide pastoral function among
the inmates and are trained to act as counselors to
6Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952);
Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).7 Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
8 In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472,372 P.2d 304 (1962).
9 Brabson v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d
693 (Sup. Ct. 1965).10 Bailleaux v. Holmes, 117 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore.
1959), g v'd sub norn., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
11374 U.S. 150 (1963).
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inmates who request help with their personal prob-
lems.
Historically, religion was believed to have great
rehabilitative potentialities. State legislatures
granted or even commanded religious services in
prisons. One early religious service held in an
American prison was delivered by a guard on the
speakers platform standing next to a loaded cannon
pointing toward the captive audience. 12
This obvious "establishment of religion" in
prisons has never been challenged in the courts.
Indeed there is much precedent for assistance to
religion by the government in many areas. Consider
the recitation of prayers by government-paid
chaplains in the House and Senate, compulsory
chapel in service academies, the inclusion of the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance,
exemption of organizations of a religious nature
from federal income tax, and postal privileges for
religious organizations.
It may be further argued that if government did
not provide religious services, chaplins, and chapels
in prisons, free exercise of religion by the inmates
would be infringed." Mr. Justice Brennan, con-
curring in Abington School District v. Schempp,14
argued that since government has deprived prison-
ers of their opportunity to practice their faith at
places of their own choosing, the state may, in order
to avoid infringing upon their freedom of religious
exercise, provide substitutes in prison.
It has been in the area of restrictions on the free
exercise of religion by inmates that has brought
numerous suits against prison wardens. The courts
have traditionally maintained a "hands off" policy
when dealing with questions involving prison
regulations and disciplinary measures. In a 1944
case one court ruled:
"The acts of prison officials, vested with a
rather wide discretion in safekeeping and se-
curing prisoners committed to their custody
and charged with the right and duty to main-
tain discipline among the inmates, should be
B2BARNs & TEFTERs, Nxw HoRizONS IN Canni-
NOLOGY 491 (1943).
1Judge Elmo B. Hunter, sitting in district court in
Kansas City, Mo., recently ruled that the authorities
at the medical center for federal prisoners in Spring-
field, Mo., must arrange for Harold Konigsberg, "one
of the biggest loan sharks in New York," to attend
Jewish services at the center. N.Y. Times, May 14,
1968, p. 51, col. 4 (city ed.).
14374 U.S. 203, 297-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring opinion).
upheld if reasonably necessary to effectuate
the purposes of imprisonment.15 "
Previous to the mid-1950's few cases involving re-
strictions on the free exercise of religion were
brought to court.
In a 1957 case, a Catholic inmate claimed that he
was being subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment as well as being deprived of his right of free
exercise of his religion.16 The petitioner was serving
a life sentence at the State Prison in New York as a
habitual offender. He was placed in the segrega-
tion wing in the Prison in October, 1952 and re-
mained there until October, 1956 when he filed a
petition in the Chancery Division asking that an
order to show cause be issued. Testimony revealed
that he had been segregated in 1952 because of his
part in a riot and had remained there following
fifteen additional violations during the four years.
Inmates in segregation do not have contact with
each other except in the segregation exercise yard
and do not at any time have contact with the gen-
eral prison population. They are not allowed to
accompany the general inmate population to chapel
for religious services, but a chaplain of each faith is
available to them for spiritual guidance. The
Catholic chaplain stated that his offers of advice,
guidance and counsel, as well as Holy Communion,
had been consistently refused by the inmate. In
holding that the denial to attend Mass was not
cruel and unusual punishment nor a deprivation of
a constitutional right of free exercise of religion,
the court stated:
"The social interest involved in depriving
plaintiff of the opportunity to attend Mass
with the rest of the prison population can
only be the preservation of order and discipline
in the prison. If plaintiff has lost any right it
has come about by his own hand. The interest
of an orderly society that required his im-
prisonment insists only that he be privileged
to worship God to the extent that his conduct
in prison permits.'"
THE PROBLEm OY BLACK MusLurS IN PRISON
During the last ten years Black Muslim prison-
ers have brought numerous suits against prison
15 Kelly v. Doud, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 784 (1944). "Prison discipline is
necessarily peremptory and is not the subject of judicial
review except in cases of gross excess." 41 Am. Jum.
Prisons & Prisoners §36 (1938).
16 McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.Y. Super. 468 (1957).
" Id. at 887.
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authorities alleging unwarranted restrictions and
discriminatory practices against their religious
practices. Most of the charges of discrimination
were well-founded and were, in fact, admitted by
prison. officials. The officials justified certain re-
strictions on the members of the Muslim faith
(receipt of newspapers, having time of prison meals
determined by Muslim procedure in order to allow
their Ramadan fasting, obtaining copies of the
chosen version of the Koran, holding unsupervised
meetings) on two basic grounds: first, it was felt
that the inflammatory doctrines of the Muslims
were an incitement to violence, and second, that
the Muslim movement is, in reality, a social and
political, rather than a religious, movement.
In bringing suits against alleged discrimination
in prison, the Muslims faced certain problems.
The major obstacle was the "hands-off" doctrine
of the courts concerning the internal administrative
functions of prison authorities.
"Ordinarily, a jailor or like prison official is
vested with a certain amount of discretion
with respect to the safe-keeping, security,
and discipline of his prisoners; and his acts,
in this respect, should be upheld, if reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purpose of im-
prisonment, so that the courts will not inter-
fere, where it does not appear that he has
misused his power for the purpose of oppres-
sion.18 "
The second problem was the exhaustion of reme-
dies doctrine: "'exhaustion' applies where a claim
is cognizable in the first instance by an administra-
tive agency alone; judicial interference is withheld
until the administrative process has run its
course." 19 Following persistent legal proceedings
by the Muslims the courts agreed to look into the
complaints of those imprisoned. And in a 1961 case,
the Supreme Court held that a state remedy need
not be first sought and refused before a federal one
is properly granted.'0
There are at least three commonly available
remedies to prison inmates who allege misconduct
on the part of prison authorities:
The first is mandamus, to compel the perform-
ance of a dear, public, legal duty, owed by a public
18 72 C.J.S. Prisons §18(a) (1951).
11 United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59,
63 (1956).20 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruling
Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950). See Recent Decisions, 60 MicH.
L. REv. 643 (1962).
official. Mandamus is not available as a matter of
right, but may be granted within the discretion of
the court when no other appropriate relief is avail-
able.21 The duty sought must be one arising from
law and not from contract. This remedy was sought
in only one case brought by the Muslims.'2
The second remedy commonly sought is a writ
of habeas corpus. Unlike other extraordinary writs,
habeas corpus is a writ of right and its issuance is
not subject to the discretion of the judge or court
issuing it. The object of the writ is to relieve the
illegally restrained prisoner in a jail or prison."
Habeas corpus may not be utilized as a corrective
measure for alleged ill treatment 24 but may be used
only to seek total release from an illegal deten-
tion.2
The third remedy, redress under the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1871,26 has been much used in
seeking relief by Muslim prisoners. Under this
Act, the plaintiff may seek money damages, in-
junctive relief, or both-although in most cases,
the Muslims have sought injunction only. Section
1983 of the Act provides for action against any
individual who deprives another of due process of
law under the fourteenth amendment. It is an ef-
fective remedy because it allows access to the
federal courts without the procedural difficulties
involved in securing habeas corpus. The Act has
been held applicable by federal courts for alleged
mistreatment by penal officials."
ILLUSTRATVE CASES
In one of the first Muslim cases, Pierce v. La-
Vallee,2" the federal district court for the northern
21 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1965).
" Tate v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555 (Del. Super. Ct.
1965).
23 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934); Taylor v.
United States, 179 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 988 (1950).
21United States ex rel. Williams v. Tahash, 189 F.
Supp. 257 (D. Minn. 1960), cerl. denied, 366 U.S. 975
(1961).
25 Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cerl
denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d
718 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944). There
has been some erosion to this rule: "A prisoner is
entitled to the writ of habeas corpus when, though
lawfully in custody, he is deprived of some rights to
which he is lawfully entitled even in his confinement."
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
26 14 U.S.C. §1343 (1964).
"Coleman v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957);
McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal.
1955); Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill.
1948).
"8 212 F. Supp. 865(N.D.N.Y.), reo'd, 293 F.2d 233
(2d Cir. 1961), dism., 212 F. Supp. 865, dim. afjd, 319
F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1963).
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district of New York ruled that the Muslim
Brotherhood in Clinton Prison was not a religion.
29
The segregation of three inmates who were con-
sidered leaders in the Brotherhood as necessary
steps in the assurance of discipline and good order
within the prison was upheld. The Muslims, ac-
cording to the court, were dedicated to the forma-
tion of secret plans, strategy, and policies, and
served as a likely fermenting point for the unrest
and frustration of the other inmates.
In another federal case arising in 1963, a suit
was brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 by
Muslim inmates for relief for alleged discrimination
by not allowing the purchase of certain religious
publications and materials disseminated by the
Black Muslim Movement." The Attorney General
of the State of Illinois asked the court to take
judicial notice of certain social studies which
allegedly showed that the Muslim Movement, de-
spite its pretext of religious facade, was an organiza-
tion that, outside of prison walls, has for its object
the overthrow of the white race, and inside prison
walls, had an impressive history of inciting riots
and violence. The Attorney General asked the court
to take notice of an official study by the Security
Section, Intelligence Division, Bureau of Inspec-
tional Services of the Chicago Police Department,
entitled "Muslim Cult of Islam-Nation of Islam,
5335 So. Greenwood Ave., Chicago, Ill." The report
stated in part:
"Federal and State prisons continue to have
serious problems involving Muslim inmates.
The State Prison in Fulton, New York, has a
50% Negro population. Twenty-five per cent
of this number claim Muslim membership in-
sisting on religious recognition and special
privileges which would obviously break down
discipline. Muslim violence also took place at
Federal prisons in Terre Haute, Ind., and at
Atlanta, Ga. Stateville and Joliet penitenti-
aries in Illinois continue to have some Muslim
activity amongst their inmates. This situation
is being closely observed to contain any inci-
dent that could arise.
31
"
The court did take judicial notice of the Chicago
report (dated May 24, 1962) citing distinguished
29212 F. Supp. at 869. But cf. Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.s. 78 (1944).
'0 Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963),
rev'd, 378 U. S. 546 (1964).
31 Id. at 167.
authorities for doing so.'2 Under the rule of Beau-
harnais v. Illinwis,"1 the court held that a state
may suppress movements that would otherwise
be constitutionally protected when they had vio-
lence as their object or an even reasonably likely
consequence.
Both of the preceding cases were reversed on
appeal, since it seemed quite obvious to most con-
stitutional authorities that under the rule of Cant-
well" and Ballard5 neither administrative nor
judicial powers may make a determination as to
what constitutes a bona fide religion.
Outside of prison walls the Muslims have gener-
ally been given the benefit of the doubt and have
been treated as a legitimate religion. Their schools
have been approved as parochial schools and both
school and temple property have been adjudged
tax exempt in most states.36
In re Ferguson posed the problem of restrictions
on religious activity of Muslim inmates in a Cali-
fornia prison. The California Supreme Court held
that the Muslim belief in black supremacy com-
bined with their reluctance to yield to any au-
thority exercised by "someone [who] does not
believe in [their] God" presented a serious threat
to the maintenance of order in a crowded prison
environment. Prisoners do have a right to possess
their religious beliefs, but assembling and discuss-
ing inflammatory Muslim doctrines in a prison
situation must be considered to be action. Follow-
ing from this premise, the court determined that
prison officials would not be acting arbitrarily or
unreasonably in withholding a version of any bible
or other religious literature adopted by the Muslim
group to support their doctrines of the supremacy
of the black race and segregation from the white
race.
In Wright v. Wilkins the court faced the prob-
lem of determining what is the practice of religion.
The inmate petitioner complained that he was not
permitted to take his Arabic grammar with him
into the prison recreation yard to use in studying
the Arabic language which he maintained would
2Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
349 U.S. 294 (1955); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952).
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
14 Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 29.
1- United States v. Ballard, supra note 29.
36 LINcoLN, Tam BLACK Musxims iN AmERICA, 210,
211 (1960).
3 55 Cal. 2d 663, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 416,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
38 26 Misc. 2d 1090,210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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be helpful to him in advancing in his Islamic re-
ligious faith. The use of a grammar to study a
foreign language, the court said, is not the practice
of a religion. The inmate admitted that he was able
to use his grammar in his cell but claimed that he
wished to reserve this cell time for other reading.
The court ruled that the New York Department of
Correction had made provisions for the religious
needs and welfare of the inmates of Attica Prison
who claimed to be Islamic as was evidenced by the
list of Islamic religious books translated into
English that were available to the prisoners. The
question of what materials a prisoner may take
with him into the prison recreation yard or else-
where in the prison is a matter of prison discipline
entrusted by the legislature to the warden of the
prison.
In Fulwood v. Clemrner,'0 the federal court ruled
on a number of significant questions, stating that
it is not a "function of the court to consider the
merits or fallacies of a religion or to praise or
condemn it, however excellent or fanatical or
preposterous it may be. Whether one is right about
his religion is not a subject of knowledge but only
a matter of opinion". The court held that officials
must allow Muslims to hold religious services
since they had already allowed other religious
groups to do so and religious medals must be
supplied to the Muslims as it was the policy of the
prison to supply such medals to other groups.
However the court upheld the denial of correspond-
ence with Elijah Mohammad (leader of the Black
Muslim movement) and restrictions on receiving
the Los Angeles Herald Dispatch which carried a
column by Elijah Mohammad. The court stated
that it lacked general supervisory powers over
prisons, and in the absence of a showing of a viola-
tion of a legal right or of an abuse of discretion by
prison officials, a court will not interfere.40
The court in Broun v. McGinnis4' upheld the
New York Corrections Law, Section 610, which
confers upon prison inmates the right to religious
services, spiritual advice, and ministration from a
recognized clergyman, but also authorizes the
reasonable curtailment of such rights if such action
is necessary for the "proper discipline and manage-
ment of the institution." The prison had refused
to allow a Muslim to communicate with a local
minister of an Islamic temple who had a prior
29 206 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D. C. 1962).
40 Citing White v. Clemmer, 295 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
4110 N.Y.2d 531, 536, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
criminal record, feeling that such communication
would be inconsistent with good administration of
the institution. The court reiterated that while
freedom to believe is absolute, freedom to act is not.
The question of having the time of prison meals
determined by Muslim procedure in order to
facilitate the Muslim Ramadan fasting was de-
cided in favor of the prison authorities in Childs v.
Pegelow,42 another federal case. The court ruled
that the determination of dining hours and prac-
tices was a matter within the routine discretion of
prison officials and no justiciable issue was pre-
sented by the inmates based on alleged denial of
the right to practice their religion through fixing
of dining hours and practices. The court again
stated that except in extreme cases, courts will
not interfere with the conduct of a prison, with
enforcement of its rules and regulations, or with
its discipline.
In Banks v. Havener" suit was filed under the
Federal Civil Rights Act wherein several inmates
of the District of Columbia youth center com-
plained of discrimination on the basis of their
Muslim faith. They claimed they were denied
regularly designated places and times for religious
services, correspondence with local Muslim minis-
ters, religious meetings conducted by authorized
ministers, subscriptions to publications and educa-
tional literature pertaining to their religion, grant-
ing of certain dietary considerations required by
the tenets of their faith, permission to possess the
Koran, and possession and display of religious
medals. The Director of the Department of Cor-
rection stated that the above privileges were taken
away following a riot in which the Muslims were
allegedly involved as leaders. They were not per-
mitted to engage in any religious activities be-
cause, the director reasoned, it constituted a clear
and present danger to the security of the institu-
tion and its inmates, and because it created tension
42321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
932 (1964). The court held that prison authorities who
had agreed to provide a pork-free diet for Muslim in-
mates before sunrise and after sunset during the
Ramadan fast need not calculate the time of sunset
according to Muslim procedure. "There is no charge
here of discrimination against plaintiffs by way of
interference with the practice of their religious beliefs.
... The plaintiffs are, in fact, seeking special privileges
because of their religious beliefs, privileges not extended
to the other inmates." Id. at 490. Claims for dietary
consideration were put forth in several cases, but the
issue has never been decided. See, e.g. Banks v. Havener,




which seriously jeopardized the therapeutic pro-
grams instituted for the rehabilitation of the
prisoners. The court ruled that the authorities
did not prove by satisfactory evidence that the
teachings and practices of the sect created a clear
and present danger to the functioning of the insti-
tution. But, the court cautioned:
"[T]he practice of this right [religious freedom]
in a penal institution is not absolute--it is sub-
ject to rules and regulations necessary to the
safety of the prisoners and the orderly func-
tioning of the institution. Adherents of the
Muslim faith, or of any other religious sect,
found guilty of violating established prison
rules will not be heard to plead religious perse-
cution, absent unusual circumstances."
In Howard v. Smyth, 45 the petitioner complained
that he was placed in solitary confinement solely
because of his refusal to identify to prison officials
the other Muslim prisoners in the institution.
There was no evidence of any disorder caused by
the petitioner's refusal. The court, in holding for
the petitioner, ruled that a prisoner is not bereft
of all of his rights. "Included among those retained
is an immunity from punishment for making a
reasonable attempt to exercise his religion, even a
religion that to some of us may seem strangely
confused and irrational." 46 The court cautioned,
however, that prison officials need not stand by if
religious services or activities are used to under-
mine the warden's legitimate disciplinary au-
thority.
CoNCLUSIONS
In analyzing the preceding cases certain trends
can be ascertained and pertinent conclusions
drawn:
1. Even as a convicted and imprisoned felon
who has lost certain civil rights and incurred cer-
tain liabilities 7 the individual still maintains an
absolute right of religious belief and conviction. 3
44 Id. at 31.
45 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385 U.S
988 (1967).
41 Id. at 431. "Convictions and incarceration deprive
him [the inmate] only of such liberties as the law has
ordained he shall suffer for his transgressions." Coffin
v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).4T See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra. Many of
these restrictions may in certain cases be unwise from a
correctional viewpoint. See discussion in PRnsmENT's
COMMSSION ON LAW EmORacExmENT AND AjymsrasTRA-
moN oe JusTicE, supra, note 1, at 45-59, 84-85.
48 See Brown, Black Muslim Prisoners and Religious
Discrimination: The Developing Criteria for Judicial
The court has no authority to make a determin-
ation as to what constitutes a bona fide religion.49
2. There is a genuine difference between freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute,
but the second cannot be.-0 The state retains an
interest in the preservation and protection of peace
and good order within its borders and particularly
within its prisons.
3. The state should accord its prisoners the
maximum religious freedom compatible with the
maintenance of prison safety and discipline."'
Courts are required to make accommodation be-
tween the constitutional guarantees as to religion
and the exercise of state authority. 2
4. Prison authorities must not discriminate in
their treatment of religious groups within the
institution. Acts of individuals of a particular
religious sect cannot be construed to allow with-
drawal of privileges and rights afforded to that
particular sect as a whole.
5. Rules and regulations should be drawn up by
prison authorities to govern the practice of religion
within the institution and to protect the rights of
the adherents of particular faiths r4
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Prison officials should be allowed discretion
in coping with the myriad problems that arise
Review, 32 GtIo. WAsH. L. REv. 1124, 1128 (1964).
Inmates in most institutions are now allowed to change
their religion. It had been previously believed that the
prison environment was so unnatural and that such
pressures could be placed upon inmates to change their
religion, that it was best to require that an inmate re-
main with his original religious preference while serving
his sentence. It is now generally felt that the prison
administration is not in a position to dictate what a
man should believe, if he demonstrates a sincere desire
to change religions. See Barkin, The Emergence of Cor-
rectional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the
Convicted, 45 NEB. L. Rv. 669, 684 (1966).4The concept of religious freedom "embraces the
right to maintain theories of life and of death and of
the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths.... The First Amendment does not
select any one group or any one type of religion for
preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position."
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
50 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
"
t See generally, Decisions, 28 Bxoon'=n L. RPv.
330-33 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Williford v. California, 217 F. Supp. 245
(N.D. Cal. 1963), rev'd, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965).
4 See, e.g., Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.
Va. 1964).
4SaMarion v. McGinnis, 253 F. Supp. 738 (D. N.Y.
1966). "While meaningful rules and regulations should
recognize the full array of rights attending the practice
of a religion, each of those rights is subject to such
limitation as may be required to preserve prison disci-
pline and security." Id. at 741.
[Vol. 60
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within the institution, including religious problems.
This discretion, however, must be reviewable by a
court when a fundamental constitutional right is
involved.55
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides the
most effective method of complaint for violations
of federal constitutional rights made applicable to
the states under the fourteenth amendment and
should be available to both state and federal
prisoners.
65 See discussion in PPEsmENT'S COsnnSSION ON
LAw ENrrzocEELNT AN AD)mqisTRATioN M JusTicE,
supra note 1, at 85.
3. The courts must open their doors to all who
wish to call into question the actions of prison
administrators. Rights guaranteed under the first
amendment are not, as the court held in Sostre v.
McGinnis," "romantic or sentimental" impedi-
ments to the disciplinary regime established by
prison administrators.
56334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892
(1964). "No romantic or sentimental view of constitu-
tional rights or of religion should induce a court to
interfere with the necessary disciplinary regime estab-
lished by the prison ofcials." 334 F.2d at 908. This
approach was widely accepted by courts in varying
degrees.
